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Abstract
This paper chooses 30 listed companies that published 
and implemented stock option incentive plans in 2011 as 
the research objects. However on account of the hysteretic 
nature, we select the relevant data about the corporate 
performance in 2013 with the application of factor analysis 
to calculate the comprehensive corporate performance 
evaluation value. After that, we introduce a series of 
indexes to construct a regression model to facilitate the 
research on the relationship between the enterprise stock 
option incentive and the corporate performance. The 
research result proves that there’s a positive correlation 
between the stock option incentive and the corporate 
performance. Finally this paper proposes a suggestion on 
the implementation of the stock option incentive plan. 
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INTRODUCTION
With the continuous increase in the degree of opening 
up in China and the development of economic market, 
the Chinese enterprises will not only face the fierce 
competition from the China domestic, but also encounter 
the more severe competition from the world. In order to 
survive in the competition, all of the enterprise throng 
to take numerous innovation measures, especially on 
the innovation of distribution system. The traditional 
incentive mechanism (such as the annual salary system) 
can only reflect the historical indicator and the short-
term indicator, unable to indicate the manager’s future 
performance and the long-term performance, prone to 
making the manager take the short-term action to lead to 
an unfavorable incentive effect. However the emergence 
of the stock option incentive system has overcome the 
above defect, managing to achieve the convergence of 
interest to both of the operators and the owners. 
Actually ever since the early of the 1990s, China had 
begun to introduce the stock option incentive system. 
However due to the fact the capital market hadn’t been 
well established and the relevant legal system hadn’t been 
developed at that time, the stock option incentive system 
didn’t function well regarding the enterprise performance 
in China with little progress having been made in the 
development. On Dec 31, 2005, CSRC (China Securities 
Regulatory Commission) published the “Administrative 
Measures for Equity Incentives of Listed Companies 
(Trial)” to lay a legal foundation for the equity incentive 
of listed companies. Then both of the SASAC under 
the State Council and the ministry of finance published 
separately on January 27 and Sept 30, 2006 the “Trial 
measures for the implementation of equity incentive plans 
by state-owned listed companies (overseas)” and the “Trial 
measures for the implementation of equity incentive plans 
by state-owned listed companies (domestic)” to provide 
the policy guidance for the implementation of equity 
incentive plans by the listed companies, making the equity 
incentive become the focus of market at that time, when 
more and more listed companies began to pay attention 
to the equity incentive plans and developed the equity 
incentive solutions, most of which were about the stock 
option incentive methods. 
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1.  THEORETICAL BASIS
The main reason that the equity incentive would arise 
is because of the principal-agent problem caused by 
the inconsistent objective function for the agent and 
the stockholder. The agency theory is mainly involved 
with the contractual relationship between the provider 
of the enterprise resources and the resource users. 
According to the agency theory, the owner of the 
economic resources is the principal, while the managers 
who take the responsibility for the use and control of 
these resources are the agents. The agency theory holds 
that when the managers themselves are the owners of 
the enterprise resources, they will possess the whole 
residual claim rights in the enterprise. Under such a 
circumstance, the managers will work for themselves and 
there would be no agency problem. However when the 
managers would absorb a new economic resource from 
the external by issuing the stocks, they will have such 
a motive to increase their company-paid consumption, 
relax themselves and try to reduce the workload. Also the 
agency theory believes that the agent has possessed more 
information than the principal. Then such information 
asymmetry will adversely affect the principal, who might 
monitor efficiently the agent to see if the agent has served 
for the benefits of the principal in a proper way. The 
theory also assumes that both of the principal and the 
agent are rational, who will maximize their own wealth 
in the course when the agency contract has been signed. 
Moreover for the sake of the profit-seeking motive, the 
agent might take every possible opportunity to increase 
their wealth. However some of their actions might damage 
the owner’s benefits. Hence it’s necessary for the principal 
to take corresponding measures to restrict the agent’s 
behavior. Then the key of the principal-agent problem is 
on the incentive and constraint.  
Of course, there’re advantages and disadvantages in 
the stock option incentive mechanism. On one hand, the 
integration of the operator’s rewards with the company’s 
long-term benefits will guarantee a high level of benefit 
consistency between the operator and the asset owner, 
making the benefits of both parties connected closely 
and capable to lock up the risk faced by the option 
holders, who won’t suffer any additional loss if they don’t 
exercise their rights. The stock option, which is the right 
of choice conferred by the enterprise to the operator, is 
the anticipated revenue realized in the uncertain market. 
Since the enterprise doesn’t make any cash payment, it 
will facilitate the enterprise to reduce the incentive cost. 
On the other hand, the risk from the stock market might 
make the operator take some short-term actions. In China, 
there’re still some defects in the existing laws regarding 
the source of stocks during the implementation of options. 
It calls for the introduction of relevant policies and laws.  
2 .   L I T E R AT U R E  R E V I E W  A N D 
RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS
Based on the data about 511 American enterprises in 1980, 
Demsetz (1985) made an empirical research on the share 
holding of the mangers and the enterprise performance. 
The research result shows that there’s no obvious linear 
relationship between these two factors. That’s to say, the 
share holding of the mangers doesn’t make any contribution 
to the improvement of the corporate performance. 
According to the financial data of 1049 listed 
companies from 1974 to 1986, Jensen and Murphy (1990) 
made a regression analysis on the performance salary of the 
senior manager and the enterprise value. The analysis result 
shows that the relationship between the performance salary 
of the senior manager and the enterprise value is extremely 
faint, proving that there’s no significant effect on the senior 
manager when the salary incentive is implemented.   
According to the data of 478 large-scale companies 
in USA from 1980 to 1990, Brian and Liebman (1997) 
studied the relationship between the CEO’s remuneration 
and the market value of the shares, finding that the 
number of the stock options held by the managers exerted 
a much stronger influence on the enterprise performance 
than the salaries and bonus they had received. Also the 
research reveals that there’s a positive correlation between 
the stock option and the enterprise performance. It means 
that the implementation of the stock option incentive plan 
will play a significant positive role in the improvement of 
enterprise performance.
Then Li and Zhao (2013) chose 67 listed companies 
who had proposed and implemented the solutions for 
the managerial equity incentive system from 2005 and 
2010 to study the stock option incentive effect of the 
listed companies through the regression analysis method. 
They made an explanation on the ROE (return on equity) 
through the following explanatory variables, including 
operating profit ratio, total assets and asset-liability ratio 
etc., coming to a conclusion that the stock option incentive 
had been working very well. It turns out that the increase 
in the operating profit ratio makes a contribution to the 
enhancement of the company performance. However 
the corporate assets won’t exert a great influence on the 
company performance. But the influence of the company’s 
financial situation, say the asset-liability ratio on the 
company performance is significant. 
On account of the fact that most of the scholars in the 
past affirmed the relationship between the stock option 
incentive and the enterprise benefit, then this paper makes 
such a hypothesis that: there’s a significant positive 
correlation between the stock option incentive and the 
performance of the listed company. 
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3.  ILLUSTRATION OF SAMPLES
This paper chooses 30 listed companies that published 
and implemented stock option incentive plans in 2011 
as the research objects. Considering that the effect of the 
stock option incentive on the company performance is 
always hysteretic due to the reason that the period for the 
implementation of stock option is normally 1-2 years, 
this paper selects the financial data in 2013 to make the 
comprehensive performance evaluation on the companies. 
In this paper, the original data that mainly comes from the 
annual report of each company and has been published on 
the SinaNet Finance and Economics (http://finance.sina.
com.cn) and Cninfo (http://www.cninfo.com.cn), has been 
imported manually and has been checked carefully for 
many times to secure the data accuracy. 
4.  PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
4.1  Selection of Financial Indexes
Table 1
Statistics of Enterprise Performance Measurement Indexes
Types of indexes Name of variables Names of index Index computation formula
Profitability
Earnings per share X1 Net profit/total shares
Rate of return on total assets X2 Net profit/average total assets
Return on equity X3 Net profit/average net assets
Operation capacity
Turnover of account receivable X4 Sales revenue/average accounts receivable
Inventory turnover ratio X5 Sales revenue/average inventory
Turnover of total capital X6 Sales revenue/average total assets
Debt paying ability
Asset-liability ratio X7 Total liabilities/ total assets
Liquidity ratio X8 Current assets/current liabilities
Quick ratio X9 (Current assets-inventories)/ current liabilities
Table 2
KMO and Bartlett Tests
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .533
Bartlett test of sphericity Chi-squared approximation 301.947
df 36
Sig. .000
Principal component extraction. Extract the main 
factors from the original numerous indexes through the 
principal component analysis method, which is also a 
factor analysis method. Table 3 reveals that three principal 
component factors have been extracted to reflect the 
original variable information with the extent to reflect the 
original variable information up to 76.183%. Meanwhile 
it reveals that there’s a high correlation between the first 
principal component and the earnings per share, the rate 
of return on total assets and the return on equity, while 
the second principal component is highly related to the 
turnover of account receivable, the inventory turnover 
ratio and the turnover of total capital. As to the third 
principal component, it has a high correlation with the 
asset-liability ratio, the liquidity ratio and the quick ratio. 
All of these prove that the result of factor extraction is 
quite favorable. 
Table 3
Total Variance Explained
Components Initial Eigenvalues Rotation Sums of Squared LoadingsTotal Total Total Total Variance % Accumulated %
1 3.433 38.140 38.140 2.882 32.019 32.019
2 2.194 24.376 62.517 2.448 27.199 59.218
3 1.230 13.667 76.183 1.527 16.965 76.183
4 .892 9.915 86.098
To be continued
Due to the reason that a single performance index used 
in the account book is unable to evaluate the company 
performance comprehensively and accurately, then in 
order to improve the accuracy of our empirical research, 
this paper chooses 9 indexes as the start of the factor 
analysis to make a comprehensive evaluation on the 
performance of the listed company from the following 
three aspects, including the enterprise profitability, the 
operation capacity and the debt paying ability.
4.2  Factor Analysis Through the SPSS Software
Test for the feasibility of factor analysis. Utilize the KMO 
standard and the Bartlett test of sphericity to test the sample 
data to see if the sample data is applicable to the factor 
analysis. The statistical observed value obtained in the 
Bartlett test of sphericity is 301.947 with the corresponding 
Sig value in close proximity to 0. Assume that the 
significance level is set to be 0.01. Then we could deny such 
a null hypothesis that the corresponding matrix is an identity 
matrix, since this Sig value is lower than the significance 
level. It means that there’s a significant correlation between 
the various variables. Meanwhile since the KMO value is 
0.533, which is bigger than 0.5, it indicates that the index 
that has been chosen is suitable for the factor analysis.
XUE Dan; DI Wei (2015). 
International Business and Management, 10(1), 66-71
69 Copyright © Canadian Research & Development Center of Sciences and Cultures
Components Initial Eigenvalues Rotation Sums of Squared LoadingsTotal Total Total Total Variance % Accumulated %
5 .634 7.042 93.140
6 .369 4.095 97.235
7 .209 2.326 99.561
8 .030 .338 99.900
9 .009 .100 100.000
Continued
4.3  Computation on the Comprehensive 
Corporate Performance Score 
Table 4
Component Score Coefficient Matrix
Components
1 2 3
Zscore: Earnings per share -.039 .381 -.121
Zscore: Rate of return on total assets .142 .395 -.021
Zscore: Return on equity -.032 .362 -.005
Zscore: Turnover of account receivable .007 -.078 .503
Zscore: Inventory turnover ratio .227 -.015 .373
Zscore: Turnover of total capital .050 -.048 .574
Zscore: Asset-liability ratio -.285 -.035 .049
Zscore: Liquidity ratio .327 .014 .019
Zscore: Quick ratio .335 .013 .034
Regarding all of the specific data provided in Table 
4, we might work out a function expression for the 
comprehensive evaluation on corporate performance:
F 1 = - 0 . 0 3 9 X 1 + 0 . 1 4 2 X 2 - 0 . 0 3 2 X 3 + 0 . 0 0 7 X 4 
+0.227X5+0.050X6-0.285X7+0.327X8+0.335X9
F2=0.381X1+0.395X2+0.362X3-0.078X4-0.015X5-
0.048X6-0.035X7+0.014X8+0.013X9
F3=-0.121X1-0.021X2-0.005X3+0.503X4+0.373X5+0.5
74X6+0.049X7+0.019X8+0.034X9
Sum up the linear weights of the scores for the three 
principal components according to the weighs, which are 
also the variance yields of the various principal components 
obtained in Table 3 to compute the comprehensive 
corporate performance evaluation value in 2012:
F = (32.019%* F1+27.199%* F2 +16.965% F3)/ 
76.183%
5.  REGRESSION TEST ON STOCK OPTIONS 
AND CORPORATE PERFORMANCE
5.1  Construction of Regression Analysis Model
This paper takes F,  the comprehensive corporate 
performance evaluation value as the explained variable with 
the application of Y1, the proportion of the stock-option 
plan in the general capital as the test variable. Meanwhile 
on account of the other factors influencing the corporate 
performance, such as the company’s capital structure, the 
nature of business and the enterprise growth, this paper 
chooses Y2, the asset-liability ratio, Y3, the nature of 
business and Y4, the net profit growth rate as the control 
variables to construct the regression model as below:
F=A0+A1 Y1 +A2 Y2+A3 Y3+A4 Y4 +u
Where F—is the comprehensive corporate performance 
evaluation value obtained after the computation based on 
the factor analysis; 
A0—is a constant term;
Ai—is the coefficient corresponding to the variables; 
(i=1,2,3,4)；
u —is the error term.
5.2  Analysis Results 
Table 5
Correlation
F Incentive amount Asset-liability ratio Nature of business Net profit growth rate
Pearson 
Correlation
F 1.000 .362 -.594 .209 .586
Incentive amount .362 1.000 -.172 .207 .024
Asset-liability ratio -.594 -.172 1.000 -.424 .026
Nature of business .209 .207 -.424 1.000 -.141
Net profit growth rate .586 .024 .026 -.141 1.000
Sig. (unilateral)
F . .025 .000 .134 .000
Incentive amount .025 . .181 .136 .451
Asset-liability ratio .000 .181 . .010 .446
Nature of business .134 .136 .010 . .228
Net profit growth rate .000 .451 .446 .228 .
Table 6
Model Summary
 Model R R2 Adjusted R2 F Sig. Durbin-Watson
1 .880a .775 .739 21.562 .000a 2.433
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Table 7
Analysis of Regression Coefficients
Model Un-standardized coefficients t Sig.B Standard error
1  (Constant) .189 .302 .627 .536
Incentive amount 13.189 5.136 2.568 .017
Asset-liability ratio -1.799 .335 -5.378 .000
Nature of business .002 .228 .011 .991
Net profit growth rate .803 .130 6.196 .000
Table 5 reveals that there’s a positive correlation 
between the amount of incentive stock option, Y1 and the 
corporate performance F. Meanwhile since the absolute 
value of the correlation coefficient between the four 
explanatory variables is lower than 0.6, it indicates that 
there’s no serious collinearity problem among the variables.
Table 6 gives the coefficient of determination for the 
model (R2), the corrected coefficient of determination 
(adjusted R2), the F test value of the model and the 
Durbin-Watson test value. The result shows that the value 
of R2 is 0.775, which not only indicates that 77.5% of 
the F variable can be explained through the other four 
variables, but also demonstrates a good fitting degree 
of the model. However the corrected R2 is able to reflect 
more efficiently the fitting degree of the model. In this 
paper, the value of R2 is 0.739, which also proves the 
favorable fitting degree of the model. The Durbin-Watson 
test value is 2.433 in close proximity to 2, reflecting 
that there’s no obvious serial correlation between the 
various variables. Regarding the F significance test, since 
the significance level is lower than 0.05, it reveals that 
regression equation is significant, which also means that 
the amount of incentive stock option, the asset-liability 
ratio, the nature of business and the net profit growth rate 
have affected significantly the corporate performance. 
The regression coefficient is provided in Table 7. 
When the significance level=0.05, the value of amount 
of incentive stock option, t is 2.568 and the Sig value is 
0.017, which is lower than 0.05, reflecting that there’s 
a significant positive correlation between the amount of 
incentive stock option and the corporate performance 
to further affirm our hypothesis. That’s to say, there’s a 
significant positive correlation between the stock option 
incentive and the performance of the listed company. 
Meanwhile the table also reveals that the sig value of 
the asset-liability ratio and the net profit growth rate is 
lower than 0.05, showing that there’s a significant positive 
correlation between the asset-liability ratio and the net 
profit growth rate with the corporate performance. However 
since the Sig value of the business nature is bigger than 0.05, 
it reflects that there’s no relationship between the nature of 
business and the corporate performance.
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION
The result of the above empirical study reveals that: 
first, the stock option incentive will facilitate the listed 
companies to improve their performance level. However 
due to the fact that there’re not many listed companies 
having implemented really the stock option incentive plans 
in China, therefore the sample data chosen in this paper 
is not comprehensive to make the result of our empirical 
study might differ somewhat from the reality. Second, 
what has been reflected by the asset-liability ratio is the 
company’s capital structure and the net profit growth rate 
only reflects the growth rate of the company. Although 
the optimization of the capital structure and the focus on 
the company’s future development will contribute to the 
improvement of the corporate performance, the nature of 
business won’t affect the corporate performance too much. 
Through the empirical analysis in this paper, we’re 
able to make some major conclusions and find the 
problems. However in order to increase the effectiveness 
of stock option incentive to make it play a positive role, 
finally this paper would like to propose some suggestions 
as below: 
Clarify and standardize the relevant laws and 
regulations. On account of the limitations to the 
stock option incentive, it’s necessary to develop 
some relevant laws and regulations to guarantee the 
smooth implementation of stock options. Meanwhile, 
the standardization and perfection of the laws and 
regulations will prevent the interest of the minority 
shareholders from being violated by the management 
and the major shareholders.
Optimize the company’s management structure. 
In order to implement the incentive mechanism more 
effectively, a standardized board of directors and internal 
supervision mechanism must be established to provide the 
powerful impetus for the company’s development.
Focus on the company’s future development. Never 
focus on the short-term benefits. Instead, it’s necessary to 
keep an eye on those long-term projects with promising 
prospect. It’s only in this way that the corporate 
performance can be enhanced efficiently to promote the 
long-term development of the company.
Enrich the corporate performance evaluation 
mechanism. The selection of performance evaluation 
index is critical as it influences the development of 
the incentive system. Therefore with the continuous 
development of the market mechanism, it’s necessary to 
make a thorough reform on the performance evaluation 
system that is centered by a single financial indicator so as 
to combine the financial indexes used in the account book 
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with the dynamic financial index to achieve a diversified 
index system.
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